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1. Abstract 
 
The project intends to investigate to what extent and under what conditions, United 
Nations human rights conventions have been internalized in the minimally democratic 
and isolated state of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The ‘spiral 
model’ of Risse et al (1999) will be used as the theoretical framework for the project. 
This framework sets out to understand the process of socialization by which principled 
ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense of collective understandings about 
appropriate behavior and leads to changes in identities, interests and behavior. The 
DPRK is chosen as the main case of study because it has acceded to and ratified four 
international human rights conventions, yet remains a minimally democratic and 
isolated state and therefore a challenging case, in which it is least likely to be true that 
the process of socialization will develop and human rights will be fully implemented in 
domestic behavior. Risse et al (1999) argues that though done for instrumental and 
tactical reasons, ratifying and acceding to international conventions mean states become 
entangled in arguments and the logic of argumentative rationality slowly but surely 
takes over. In the analysis, the extent of this entanglement and therefore extent of 
DPRK internalization of international human rights norms is explored using certain 
progress benchmarks based on the later stages of the ‘spiral model’ with a focus on the 
extent of legal reform, the human rights condition on the ground as well as the 
engagement of the DPRK with its critics. It is concluded that the DPRK has become 
entangled to a certain, though limited, extent with a particular priority placed on social 
and economic rights.  
2. Introduction  
Since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights in 1948, the number of signatories to Human Rights conventions and 
treaties has dramatically increased. The universal idea and recognition of basic human 
rights as prescribed by the United Nations has only widened in scope. Norms and 
specifically human rights have since 1948 become increasingly institutionalized in 
Marie Gertz Schlundt, Roskilde University, GS-K1 Project 
3 
 
international law. “After 1985, we can say that the world began a process of a genuine 
international “norms cascade,” as the influence of international human rights norms 
spread rapidly.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 21) This has meant faster human rights change and 
contributed greatly to the clarification of defining human rights and what constitutes 
violation as well as the drawing up of specific procedures by which norm leaders can 
coordinate disapproval and sanctions for norm breaking. (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998)  
As supported by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, Risse et al define international 
norms as, “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Risse et 
al 1999, p. 236) Historically, these norms, expressed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the main international institution on Human Rights; The United 
Nations Human Rights Commission, have been around since 1948 and the main treaties 
and conventions, since 1976. However, not until the mid-1980s were all the parts of this 
structure fully formed and dense, “with the increasing number of human rights treaties, 
institutions, NGOs, increased foundation funding for human rights work – and human 
rights had become a part of foreign policy of key countries.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 31) 
“International law and international organizations are still the primary vehicles for 
stating community norms and for collective legitimation” (Risse et all 1999, p 8) and 
the speed of normative change is only accelerating; “the expansion of international 
organizations (especially with the UN) is contributing to this acceleration process by 
providing more opportunities to address and negotiate on a broad range of normative 
issues.” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) 
Though, the international human rights regime has expanded and deepened greatly 
across and inside states, gross violations of human rights are still being carried out. This 
reluctance to uphold and internalize human rights poses great challenges for actors in 
the human rights regime in their struggle towards achieving universal human rights and 
leads to a questioning of the adequacy of present approaches and avenues towards 
dealing with norm-violating states. In addressing this issue, it becomes important to 
explore how international human rights norms, in the shape of United Nations treaties 
and conventions, are internalized, essentially through reform and revision of present 
laws, in the state. Specifically, in a state that clearly meets the criteria of a challenging 
case for the international community. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn 
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Sikkink have constructed a theoretical framework, consisting of a ‘spiral model’, aimed 
at explaining the causal mechanisms and conditions in this human rights internalization 
process. This model will be used to explore under what conditions and to what extent 
human rights norms are internalized in a minimally democratic and isolated state and 
thereby help to examine the adequacy of present approaches and avenues in dealing 
with norm violating states. 
A state which meets the criteria of a minimally democratic and isolated state, perhaps to 
the highest extent, is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The DPRK was 
admitted as a member to the United Nations in 1991 (United Nations 2006), acceded to 
the 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) in 1981, the 1976 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 1981, the 
1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) in 2001 and ratified the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
in 1990. (United Nations Treaty Collection 2010) The DPRK, though a signatory to 
these human rights conventions, continues to violate human rights on a broad scale. The 
Special Rapporteur to the DPRK1 has criticized the DPRK for its “abysmal” human 
rights record, citing food shortages, public executions, and torture. (Human Rights 
Watch 2010) Furthermore, it has been estimated that there are up to 200.000 political 
prisoners in DPRK and it has been dubbed the world’s worst violator of press freedom 
by Reporters Without Borders (North Korea Country Profile 2010).   
 
With the accession to and ratification of these international conventions as well as the 
participation in the December 2009 Universal Periodic Review during the sixth session 
of the universal periodic review, (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) it can be 
argued that the DPRK has shown, in principle, a certain degree of acceptance of certain 
global human rights norms. However, under what conditions and to what extent are 
these international human rights norms internalized in the DPRK? 
                                                          
1Vitit Muntarbhown1, who has served for six years, was replaced by Marzuki Darusman in June 2010. (United Nations Secretary-
General 2010) 
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3. Problem Field 
The DPRK presents an extreme version of the challenge faced by the international 
human rights regime. This, because it has a daunting record of human rights abuses 
whilst being an isolated, minimally democratic state, somewhat resistant to the dictates 
of international laws and opinion and therefore a case frustrating many human rights 
actors. The international legal system offers a variety of avenues for action to be taken. 
Accession to and ratification of international conventions allows for one avenue for 
human rights actors to pursue and use to act on the abuses in the DPRK and specifically 
helps link NGOs to the larger framework of international legal institutions and creates 
the transnational network needed, according to Risse et al (1999).  
The case studies used by Risse et al (1999) demonstrate that, “network socialization 
works particularly well where domestic societies are relatively “open”.” (Risse et al 
1999, p. 263) This can be said to be lacking to a great extent in the DPRK. Furthermore, 
though the laws and Constitution of the DPRK may express certain rights of the North 
Korean people, they are all constrained by the authoritarian nature of the state and are 
therefore greatly limited in being carried out. “Participation in government, freedom of 
expression, access to information, freedom of association, and freedom of religion are 
all constrained by the nature of the State, despite their nominal recognition in the 
Constitution and related laws.” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) The UN 
Special Rapporteur similarly argues that, “the existence of laws and institutions is often 
a façade to cloak arbitrary action and abusive discretion in the name of the State.” 
(United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010) This highly personalistic nature of leadership 
seen in the DPRK renders sustainable human rights change more problematic than for 
other states, 
On the one hand, such rule can result in more rapid short-term progress 
along the course of our “spiral model,” precisely because an influential 
leader can quickly institute human rights norms from the top down. 
However, personalist rule has the great disadvantage of “short-circuiting” 
the socialization process at the level of civil society. Under such 
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conditions, it is likely that deep and internalized support for human rights 
norms will take longer to develop” (Risse et al 1999, p. 257) 
Moreover, the electoral process and system in the DPRK is built to support a one-party 
state2 and though Risse et al do suggest that “institutionalization forms part of the 
“socializing landscape” in one-party systems.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 249) It is 
specifically recognized by Risse et al that the incorporation of international human 
rights norms into domestic institutions and law is most pronounced in democratic 
governments with fully functioning multi-party systems. The importance of 
international human rights norms as a criterion of a modern statehood has risen parallel 
to increased global interconnectedness and interdependency. “International human 
rights norms have become constitutive for modern statehood; they increasingly define 
what it means to be a “state” thereby placing growing limits on another constitutive 
element of modern statehood, “national sovereignty”.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 236) This 
has meant that the ability of states to refuse or limit the importance of human rights 
being internalized and implemented has become progressively more difficult. However, 
because an isolated and minimally democratic state such as the DPRK puts little value 
in gaining membership in an emerging community of liberal states and because 
“international legitimation is important insofar as it reflects back on a government's 
domestic basis of legitimation and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in 
power.” The DPRK is less vulnerable to pressures than a state that does have to live up 
to this domestic basis of legitimation because of a strong democracy and a state that 
values the membership of a community of liberal states “To the degree that a nation 
values its membership in an emerging community of liberal states, it will be more 
vulnerable to pressures than a state that does not value such membership.” (Risse et al 
1999, p. 24) It therefore becomes interesting to explore to what extent such a state does 
internalize the norms characteristic of a modern state.  
                                                          
2 People are pressured to vote for the ruling elite, and it is reported that community leaders visit households to pressure them to vote; 
failure to vote is unacceptable and voting against those in power is regarded as reactionary and subject to punishment. Trade unions 
and mass movements (associations) are controlled by the Government as part of the State machinery. (United Nations Special 
Rapporteur 2010)  
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4. Problem Formulation 
To what extent and under what conditions have United Nations human rights 
conventions been internalized in the minimally democratic state of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea? 
5. Theory 
In the book, The Power of Human Rights: International ?orms and Domestic Change 
from 1999, Risse et al attempt to understand the conditions under which the principles, 
norms and rules embedded in the international human rights regime are internalized 
domestically and, “thus affect political transformation processes.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 
3) The process by which principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense 
of collective understandings about appropriate behavior and leads to changes in 
identities, interests and behavior is conceptualized in this book as the process of 
socialization. The authors argue that norms influence political change through this 
socialization process that combines, “instrumental interests, material pressures, 
argumentation, persuasion, institutionalization, and habitualization.” (Risse et al 1999, 
p. 37) The three phases of socialization necessary for enduring human rights change 
include; (1) adaptation and strategic bargaining, (2) moral consciousness-raising, 
argumentation, and persuasion, and (3) institutionalization and habitualization. (Risse et 
al 1999, p. 5) This framework operates through a five-phase “spiral model” of human 
right change; (1) Repression and activation of network, (2) Denial, (3) Tactical 
concessions, (4) Precriptive status and (5) Rule-consistent behavior. (Risse et al 1999, p. 
22-35)  
The significance of each phase of socializations varies with different stages of the 
socialization process. The spiral model can therefore be used to explain the variation in 
the extent to which states have internalized norms, and specifically international human 
rights norms. It can be argued that the DPRK has acceded to the four conventions for 
purely instrumental reasons as representative of the ‘repression’ and ‘denial’ stage and 
not for reasons based on argumentative rationality and a genuine acceptance of 
international human rights norms as representative of the ‘prescriptive stage’. (Risse et 
al 1999) Though, reasons may be purely instrumental, ratifying and acceding to 
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international conventions mean states; “become entangled in arguments and the logic of 
argumentative rationality slowly but surely takes over.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 16) 
“Socialization processes start when actors adapt their behavior in accordance with the 
norm for initially instrumental reasons.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 16) Adopting behavior in 
accordance with the norm for initially instrumental reasons means adjusting behavior to 
international human right norms without necessarily believing in the validity of the 
norms. This generally happens when states are under pressure in some way, “under 
increasing international pressure, norm-violating governments feel that they must make 
some concessions in order to increase their domestic or international room to maneuver, 
to increase their legitimacy, or simply to regain foreign aid.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 252) It 
can be argued, that some of the pressure leading the DPRK to adapt their behavior in 
accordance with human rights through the conventions, lies in its aid dependency. In 
September 2009, the World Food Programme reported that a third of North Korean 
women and children are malnourished and the country will run short by almost 1.8 
million metric tons of food, which North Korea would need to import or obtain as aid. 
(Human Rights Watch 2010) This clearly shows the dependency of the DPRK on 
outside aid; aid that has declined significantly over the past few years3 (United Nations 
Secretary General 2010) and which has fallen drastically following May 2009 nuclear 
tests4 and general donor fatique5. Another aspect that might explain the DPRK making 
tactical concessions is that its identity is increasingly becoming limited in the world, 
both as a communist and authoritarian state and is challenged by identity claims from 
strongly democratic modern states. The DPRK claims to be the embodiment of a 
particular transnational class and, “whenever a state makes a discursive claim to be a 
particular identity, and that identity is challenged by groups making different identity 
                                                          
3 “The World Food Program scaled back its emergency operation to reach only 2.4 million out of an originally planned 6 million 
people.” (Amnesty International 2010) 
4 “In 2009 North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons program grabbed headlines across the world and dominated diplomatic 
efforts by foreign governments. North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile in April. The United Nations Security Council 
issued a statement condemning the move, and in protest North Korea quit multilateral efforts at ending its nuclear weapons 
program—the so-called Six-Party talks involving the two Koreas, the US, China, Japan, and Russia.” (Human Rights Watch 2010) 
5 “The United Nations agencies providing humanitarian assistance in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are increasingly 
faced with critical funding shortages. They have managed to mobilize only 20 per cent of the $492 million required in 2009. This 
has led to a downsizing of operations, with several areas and some vulnerable groups no longer receiving international assistance. 
Early in 2010, in order to provide some respite, the Central Emergency Response Fund allocated $8 million for underfunded 
humanitarian projects. Another $5 million was allocated to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by the Fund in July 2010. 
However, the limited support provided by the Fund is insufficient to meet the humanitarian needs in the country.” (United Nations 
Secretary-General 2010) 
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claims from within or without,” (Risse et al 1999, p. 274) that state is more likely to 
make tactical concessions. 
It can be argued that the DPRK has adjusted to external pressure, for a number of 
reasons, and made tactical concessions such as releasing political prisoners and 
acceding to and ratifying international conventions. Furthermore, in 2009 the DPRK 
amended Article 8 of the Constitution to include a broad provision of the country’s 
respect and protection of human rights, argued by the DPRK to serve as a, 
“manifestation of the commitment of the State to ensuring full enjoyment by citizens of 
human rights on a high standard.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal 
Periodic Review 2009) However, this is argued by Human Rights Watch to serve 
nothing more than lip-service to human rights6. (Human Rights Watch 2010)  
For whichever of the above reasons, these are representative of instrumental adaptations 
to growing international pressure which again is a typical reaction of norm-violating 
governments in early stages of the socialization process. Therefore, it can be argued that 
legally recognizing the importance of human rights, through acceding to and ratifying 
conventions, does not justify placing the respective country in the prescriptive status 
phase. However it does,  
Suggest that the first steps toward this stage are usually made during 
earlier phases of the “spiral model”. Ratification of this or that 
international human rights agreement may constitute a tactical concession 
rather than full acceptance of its precise normative content. Nevertheless, 
the empirical case studies used in the research of Risse et al provide ample 
evidence that the acceptance of international norms through treaty 
ratification is not inconsequential. Governments entangle themselves in an 
international and domestic legal process which they subsequently find 
harder and harder to escape. (Risse et al 1999, p. 248) 
                                                          
6 The human rights conditions in North Korea remain dire. There is no organized political opposition, free media, functioning civil 
society, or religious freedom. Arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and lack of due process remain 
serious issues. North Korea operates detention facilities including those popularly known as “political prison camps” where 
hundreds of thousands of its citizens—including children—are enslaved in deplorable conditions for various anti-state offenses. 
Collective punishment is the norm for such crimes. Periodically, the government publicly executes citizens for stealing state 
property, hoarding food, and other “anti-socialist” crimes.” (Human Rights Watch 2010) 
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Consequently, as argued by Risse et al (1999), states start to use arguments to further 
their “instrumentally defined interests” and engage in rhetoric; 
The more they justify their interest, however, the more others will start 
challenging their arguments and the validity claims inherent in them. At 
this point, governments need to respond by providing further arguments. 
They become entangled in arguments and the logic of argumentative 
rationality slowly but surely takes over. It follows that we expect 
argumentative rationality, dialogue, and processes of persuasion to prevail 
in later stages of the socialization process (Risse et al 1999, p. 16) 
Therefore, the main premise evaluated with regards to the DPRK and at the basis for 
asking to what extent conventions have been internalized in the DPRK is that the more 
governments, “ “talk the talk”..the more they entangle themselves in a moral discourse 
which they cannot escape in the long run.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 16) It therefore becomes 
important to investigate to what extent and under what conditions the DPRK has, by 
ratifying and acceding to international conventions, become entangled in this 
international and domestic legal process. Consequently, this will help answer to what 
extent and under what conditions the United Nations human rights conventions have 
been internalized in the minimally democratic state of the DPRK. 
6. Methodological and Theoretical Considerations 
6.1 Explanation of the Problem Formulation 
The project will seek to answer how and to what extent international human rights 
norms in the form of international human rights conventions influence the domestic 
behavior of the minimally democratic and isolated state of the DPRK. In answering this, 
the social constructivist ‘spiral model’ of Risse et al will be used as a theoretical 
framework. The importance of international human rights norms as a criterion of a 
legitimate state has risen parallel to increased global interconnectedness and 
interdependency. It has therefore, become progressively more difficult for states to 
refuse or limit the importance of human rights being internalized and implemented. For 
this reason, what becomes important to human rights researchers and academics is the 
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process behind this internalization and exploring the main theoretical approaches 
available to human rights activist and policy makers.   
The project addresses a crucial issue in the international human rights regime in relation 
to the implementation and internalization of human rights treaties in norm-violating 
states. The contribution of the project is that it seeks to investigate the human rights 
internalization process in a minimally democratic and isolated state which because of 
these characteristics, to a certain extent falls outside the influence of increased 
globalization and therefore poses a very challenging case. Yet, because it has acceded to 
and ratified certain international conventions, according to Risse et al (1999), will 
become entangled in an international and domestic legal process which it subsequently 
will harder and harder to escape. The extent to which this entanglement can be seen and 
these conventions have, in fact, been internalized in the DPRK and influenced its 
domestic legal framework, its engagement with critics as well as the human rights 
situation on the ground becomes the focus of the project.  
6.2 Empirical Choices 
The empirical choice of using the DPRK as the main case study for the project is based 
on an interest in variation in the impact of international norms. The DPRK is suited to 
permit an in depth understanding of how international norms are internalized in a very, 
perhaps the most, isolated state in the world. Therefore, it provides a very challenging 
and hence, interesting case for human rights internalization.  
 
One of the advantages of case methods is, “their value as a useful means to closely 
examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; 
and their capacity for addressing causal complexity.” (Bennett & George 2005, p. 19) 
Hence, the DPRK is used to examine the causal mechanisms, and addressing the causal 
complexity, of the ‘spiral model’. Furthermore, case studies are valuable in testing 
theoretical hypotheses as is done in the project. 
 
The DPRK is therefore used as the case study for the project because it encompasses the 
conditions of a minimally democratic and isolated state and in that respect constitutes a 
least likely case of international human rights norms being internalized in the DPRK. It 
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becomes interesting to use a least likely case to investigate the internalization of human 
rights norms because, whilst it demands strong attention from human rights researchers, 
it challenges the usual approach of international human rights actors and processes as 
well as theoretical frameworks.  
 
The conventions, acceded to and ratified by, the DPRK are; The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Focus is placed on these 
conventions and the difference that exist in present national standards in order to 
explore and determine the subsequent progress or lack thereof on these human rights 
issues in the DPRK. The international human rights conventions, acceded to and ratified 
by the DPRK, are given such special attention because they are the, “only aspects of the 
U.N. system involving human rights with which North Korea cooperates” (Cammarota 
et al 2007) The influence of these conventions on the domestic framework of the DPRK 
is therefore the focus of the project and is used to answer the extent of the 
internalization. The reason for focusing on all four conventions is to provide a 
comprehensive look at a range of human rights and perhaps find different levels of 
influence on the DPRK. It should be noted that there is a total of sixteen UN human 
rights conventions, of which the DPRK has acceded to and ratified four. (United 
Nations Treaty Collection 2010) 
 
To analyze the extent of the internalization of human rights in the DPRK, the data used 
are high level reports from the United Nations human rights body and human rights 
NGO’s such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as news 
reports. UN documents and reports are based largely on reports of NGOs. These 
include; The 2010 General Assembly Report of the Secretary-General (United Nations 
Secretary-General 2010), the national report of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea for the Universal Periodic Review (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea - 
Universal Periodic Review 2009),  see annexes 1 and 2 in the appendix for a list of the 
contributors to the report, the report of the Working Group for the Universal Periodic 
Review (Universal Periodic Review Working Group 2010), the 2010 report of the 
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United Nations Special Rapporteur to the DPRK (United Nations Special Rapporteur 
2010),  the 2010 Human Rights Watch country summary (Human Rights Watch 2010), 
the 2010 Amnesty International report (Amnesty International 2010) and articles on the 
DPRK from BBC News and Reuters. These reports all provide overviews of continued 
human rights concerns and information regarding the level of engagement of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and are therefore of use in the analysis. 
6.3 Choice of theory and applying theoretical approaches 
The main theoretical framework of the project focuses on the work of Risse et al and the 
social constructivist ‘spiral model’. This model can be used to explore the impact of 
international human rights norms as embodied in international conventions and treaties. 
Risse et al explore a theoretical framework for norms socialization, defined as the 
process whereby human rights norms become internalized. “The goal of socialization is 
for actors to internalize norms, so that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure 
compliance.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 11) According to Risse, Ropp and Sikkink there exist 
three phases of this socialization process and the framework operates through a five-
phase ‘spiral model’ of human rights change. The model specifies the causal 
mechanisms in each phase of the process and contains hypotheses about the conditions 
under which progress is expected as to human rights internalization. The claim made by 
Risse et al that the, “model is generalizable across cases irrespective of cultural, 
political, or economic differences among countries.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 6) suggests 
applicability to even the least-likely case of the DPRK. 
The field of international relations theory has, since the end of World War II, mostly 
been preoccupied with the theoretical debate between realist and liberal interpretations 
of international behavior. Constructivist interpretations only reached the field of 
international relations in the 1990s. However, by the late 1990s, “constructivism had 
become the “third debate” in the field and began penetrating most subfields of the 
discipline, including the study of international human rights.” (Marsh & Payne 2007) 
The relationship between ideas and social processes of the ‘spiral model’ draws on the 
work of social constructivist theory (Risse et al 1999, p. 236) In their article, The 
Globalization of Human Rights and the Socialization of Human Rights ?orms, Marsh & 
Payne (2007) further argue that the work of Risse et al on the power of human rights is 
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one of the, “most influential and groundbreaking works to emerge in this area of 
literature.” (Marsh & Payne 2007) The model of Risse et al (1999), can not only be used 
to explain much of what is seen in the world today in terms of respect for human rights 
but, can also explain various levels of violations and abuse of these human rights as 
well. (Marsh & Payne 2007)  
Generally, in political theory, norm-based and interest-based behavior is separated as 
two distinct types of behavior. The, “frequently heard arguments about whether 
behavior is norm-based or interest-based miss the point that norm conformance can 
often be self-interested, depending on how one specifies interests and the nature of the 
norm.” (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998) According to Sikkink & Finnemore, transnational 
norm entrepreneurs (human rights non-governmental organizations and international 
organizations) are extremely rational in their means-ends calculations about how to 
achieve their goals and engage in so called “strategic social construction”: 
These actors are making detailed means-ends calculations to maximize 
their utilities, but the utilities they want to maximize involve changing the 
other players' utility function in ways that reflect the normative 
commitments of the norm entrepreneurs. The first half of the process fits 
nicely in a rational game-theoretic framework. The second half does not. 
(Sikkink & Finnemore 1998) 
It therefore becomes important, as suggested by Risse et al, to acknowledge the link 
between instrumental rationality and social constructions instead of opposing it, seen in 
the realist versus idealist argument, when exploring human rights internalization. 
Because the internalization of international human rights norms in the DPRK through 
international conventions comprises of an isolated, minimally democratic and 
authoritarian state deciding to officially accept international human rights norms, it is 
likely to involve this ‘self-interested norm conformance’ and engagement in ‘strategic 
social construction’ by human right actors. Therefore, the social constructivist ‘spiral 
model’ by Risse et al was chosen as the theoretical framework for the project.  
6.4 Limitations of the theory 
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Marsh & Payne make the argument7 that although states may engage in certain behavior 
of phase four, it does not necessarily mean they will make the final leap to phase five of 
rule-consistent behavior. Many countries have reached phase five through century long 
human rights movements and not through progressing though the earlier stages. This 
criticism, however, seems to suggest that the model has more explanatory power for 
cases of recent norm-violations and therefore a case such as the DPRK.    
Shor critisises the theory on three points,  
(1) over-deterministic and idealist in its proposition that once progress 
toward human rights compliance has started there is no turning back; (2) 
treats a country's human rights practices as a homogenous block and does 
not leave room for disaggregation of different practices; and (3) fails to 
sufficiently account for the role of serious conflicts and security threats in 
shaping state's repressive policies. (Shor 2008) 
However, Shor does claim that the model is useful for understanding the processes 
behind human rights change when complemented with other sociological and 
international approaches. Because the Risse et al spiral model is believed to be adequate 
in answering the problem formulation and due to project size restrictions, this was 
decided against for this project. 
6.5 Source Critique  
Though, as argued, the DPRK is suited to permit an in depth understanding of how 
international norms are internalized in a very, perhaps the most, isolated state in the 
world and therefore provides a very challenging and hence, interesting case for human 
rights internalization. Measuring compliance with and the effectiveness of human rights 
conventions on a minimally democratic and isolated state such as the DPRK is greatly 
                                                          
7 The model is, “very linear, even teleological..it has an ultimate destination and there are no points along the way marking possible 
detours or obstacles to derail movement in the planned direction. While we may be able to place all countries in the world into one 
of these phases, the fact is that most of the states in phase five did not get there by progressing through the earlier stages. Many 
countries have reached phase five through human rights movements from primarily domestic sources, which evolved over centuries. 
Thus, even if governments around the world engage in behavior that would place them in phase four, it is not a foregone conclusion 
that they will make the final quantum leap to phase five.” (Marsh & Payne 2007) 
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complicated by the lack of comprehensive information and the, “relative scarcity of 
accurate information on state practices.” (Hathaway 2002)  It remains very difficult to 
retrieve reliable empirical evidence from inside the DPRK. This is further 
acknowledged by the United Nations Secretary-General, “At the outset, I note the 
challenges faced in gathering information or carrying out a comprehensive assessment 
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on human rights and humanitarian 
issues.” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) Therefore, the main empirical 
evidence is gathered from official UN documents and NGO reports as they remain the 
most comprehensive and reliable reports available to human rights researchers. The 
national report of the DPRK for the Universal Periodic Review is also used to gain the 
perspective of the DPRK and facts on actual law reforms. This report has to be seen 
critically, as the DPRK continues to refuse to recognize that violations are carried out 
and, disregard actual realities on the ground. This can be seen by statements such as, 
“no one is left homeless,” and “there are no unemployed people in the DPRK” 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) which do 
seem somewhat un-realist when even the most developed welfare states in the world 
have homeless and unemployed people.  
6.6 Limitations of the Project 
Bennett & George will argue that, “case studies remain much stronger at assessing 
whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing how much it 
mattered. (Bennett & George 2005, p. 25) As the project investigates to what extent 
human rights conventions have been internalized in the DPRK, it can be argued that this 
is a ‘how much’ question and therefore remains weak as opposed to the ‘whether’ and 
‘how’ questions when using case studies.  
It can be argued that it would have been a more comprehensive project, had it included 
both within case analysis and cross case comparisons. “There is a growing consensus 
that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a 
combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or 
research program.” (Bennet & George 2005, p. 18) However, a decision was taken to 
only conduct a within case analysis as this was seen as adequate in answering the 
specific problem formulation and due to limitations regarding project size. 
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7. Analysis 
The analysis will investigate to what extent international human rights norms have 
influenced the domestic legal framework of and the human rights situation in the 
DPRK. The argument made by Risse et al (1999) that ratifying and acceding to 
conventions results in states becoming entangled in an international and domestic 
process which it subsequently finds harder and harder to escape will be evaluated using 
certain progress benchmarks. Though, it is argued that the DPRK is positioned in the 
early stages of the ‘spiral model’ and is lacking in even meeting the notions of these 
stages, relevant indicators of and criteria for the ‘prescriptive stage’ of the ‘spiral 
model’ can be used as the basis for these progress benchmarks. This, because meeting 
these indicators and living up to this criteria suggests movement on the spiral model 
towards ‘rule-consistent behavior’ and stronger human rights internalization. The 
progress benchmarks are; 
1. Institutionalization of norms in the constitution and domestic law: “Norms 
are institutionalized in the constitution and/or domestic law” (Risse et al 1999, p. 29) 
This, through reform of existing laws, emergence of new laws and changes to the 
constitution that meet the international human rights standards of the four human rights 
conventions. Furthermore, that, “there is some institutionalized mechanisms for citizens 
to complain about human rights violations” (Risse et al 1999, p. 29) 
2. Improvement of the human rights condition on the ground in the DPRK: 
“Words need to be matched by deeds. Prescriptive status of international human rights 
norms implies that governments make a sustained effort to improve the human rights 
conditions. In other words we expect the “prescriptive status” phase to be followed over 
time by the ultimate phase of our socialization model, “rule consistent behavior.” (Risse 
et al 1999, p. 30)  
3. Engagement through dialogue with critics of the human rights regime: In 
treating accusations of the transnational networks and others of continued violations of 
human rights, national governments, “engage in a dialogue with their critics, try to 
legitimize their behavior by referring to the norm, apologize, or promise and deliver 
compensation.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 30) The engagement of the DPRK with the 
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international human rights regime through the participation in international forums 
where the human rights situation of the DPRK is being reviewed will be evaluated 
against this backdrop. 
The extent to which the DPRK has met these benchmarks will be explored using the 
periodic reviews of the four conventions, reports of the UN special rapporteur, General-
Secretary and the Universal Periodic Review process including national reports, as well 
as yearly reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. This will help to 
evaluate the theoretical argument of Risse et al and answer to what extent and under 
what conditions, the human rights conventions have been internalized in the minimally 
democratic state of the DPRK 
7.1 Institutionalization of norms in the constitution and domestic law 
The DPRK remains very confident with regards to its internalization of human rights 
norms, as prescribed in human rights conventions, in its constitution and laws8. Through 
periodically addressing each UN human rights convention acceded to or ratified by the 
DPRK, and evaluating its consequent effect on domestic law through reform or 
emergence of new laws, it can be answered whether the benchmark has been met and 
thereby under what conditions and to what extent, the conventions have in fact been 
internalized in the minimally democratic state of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea.  
Firstly, the effects of the accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (CCPR) in 1981 will be explored. As noted, civil and political rights in the 
DPRK are very limited. However, since accession to the CCPR, “there have been some 
law reforms, such as periodic adjustments of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code.” (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010) The United Nations Special 
Rapporteur argues that some legislative reforms are constructive and highlights the 
introduction of the principle of ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ (according to which people 
                                                          
8 “The rights set forth in the international human rights instruments are effectively guaranteed in the DPRK through the 
Constitution, sector-specific laws and regulations. The requirements of international human rights instruments are given effect either 
through their incorporation into domestic laws and regulations or through direct invocation of the provisions of the instruments.” 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
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should be criminalized only where the crimes are expressly stipulated in law) into the 
Criminal code and related procedure code.  
In their national report, meant as a response to accusations of violations of human rights 
made by the international community, the DPRK argues that its citizens have freedoms 
of assembly and demonstration under the Constitution and freedom of association by 
virtue of the Constitution. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic 
Review 2009) It is further stated that, 
The DPRK legalized as fundamental social and political rights, the right to 
elect and to be elected, the freedom of expression, assembly and 
association, and religious beliefs and is ensuring them in practice…All 
citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be 
elected, irrespective of sex, nationality, occupation, length of residence, 
property status, education, party affiliation, political views or religion. 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 
2009) 
Specifically, the DPRK argues, regarding fundamental civil and political rights such as 
the right to elect and be elected, that the domestic law is adequate in ensuring these 
rights and therefore requires no reform.    
Furthermore, with reference to the freedom of opinion and expression, the DPRK 
argued at the Universal Periodic Review that,  
 
There are 480 kinds of newspapers published and circulated at national 
and provincial level, factories, enterprises and universities and there are 
hundreds of kinds of magazines published by scores of publishing houses. 
All citizens can express their views and opinions through TVs and 
publications. They have the freedom of literary and creative activities by 
virtue of the Constitution and relevant laws. (Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
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Though it seems that North Koreans enjoy many rights with regards to freedom of 
speech and opinion, it needs to be recognized that they are greatly limited by 
governmental control9 and even other opposing law. The DPRK Criminal Code actually 
provides that, “listening to broadcasts and retaining or disseminating information 
perceived as opposing the State are punishable by up to two years in a ‘labour training 
camp’ or, in more serious cases, five years of “corrective labour”.” (United Nations 
Secretary-General 2010) 
North Koreans have always experienced very limited freedom of movement both 
internally and externally. Specifically, in clear violation of article 12 of the CCPR, 
Article 62 of the DPRK Criminal Code bans citizens from travelling to another country 
without state permission. (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) However, there have 
been some signs of relaxation in the law on this issue. “Law reform which introduced 
labour training for those leaving the country without permission – a lighter sanction 
than the previously used imprisonment – suggests a slight hiatus from severe sanctions.” 
(United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010)  
 
The DPRK justice system is also a point of critique for the human rights regime. The 
DPRK argues that public prosecutors conduct regular surveillance of the institutions of 
investigation ensuring necessary legal measures taken in case any violation of human 
rights is found. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 
2009) However, as argued by the special rapporteur, “judges, prosecutors, lawyers and 
juries are part of the state machinery, far removed from the international rule of law, 
thus lacking in independence of the judiciary and safeguards for the accused.” (United 
Nations Special Rapporteur 2010) This leads to, “serious doubts about the independence 
of the judiciary, making it unlikely that North Korea’s own justice system would 
genuinely pursue human rights abuses carried out as State policy.” (Cammarota et al 
2007)  
                                                          
9 “While cell phones are now allowed in the capital city, use near the border is prohibited. Radio sets are pre-tuned to government 
programmes and it is forbidden to view videos from other countries. Reading books from the Republic of Korea is regarded as 
espionage, and there are sanctions against reading books from China. It is forbidden to own computers without permission. There 
are special squads which raid homes to see whether there are illegal materials from other countries, and neighbours/communities are 
encouraged to inform on each other. Bribery may attenuate arrests and sanctions.” (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010) 
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At the 2009 Universal Periodic Review, the DPRK acknowledged that public execution 
is only applied as punishment to criminals who have committed “very brutal violent 
crimes.” However, failed to define what constitutes these crimes. The Criminal Code 
provides for the punishment of death penalty for, “conspiracy to overturn the State, 
treason against the fatherland, terrorism and treason against the people.” (United 
Nations Secretary-General 2010) Thereby, indicating no change in the policy of practice 
of the DPRK on this issue.  
With regards to the ‘prescriptive stage’ indicator providing there is some 
institutionalized mechanisms for citizens to complain about human rights violations. 
The DPRK argues, speaking of its citizens, that, “they have the rights, under the Law on 
Complaints and Petitions, to criticize institutions, enterprises and organizations, and 
civil servants for their illegal acts and lodge complaints against them and have them 
redressed. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
And furthermore, that, “the citizens whose rights are violated are duly compensated. The 
compensation system is guaranteed by the Civil Law, the Law on Compensation for 
Damages, the Law on Complaints and Petition and other relevant laws.” (Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) Furthermore, in the 
DPRK, a group of people’s committees as well as judicial and people’s security 
organs10, assume direct responsibility for ensuring human rights. Nonetheless, it has to 
be recognized that the previously mentioned lacking independence of the judiciary may 
also have some relevance pertaining to this issue and thereby limit these, though 
strongly articulated, rights  
With regards to DPRK accession to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) in 1981, during the interactive dialogue of the Universal 
Periodic Review, of the fifty-two countries that took the floor, “a number of countries 
recognized the significant achievements by DPRK in the fields of health, education, 
                                                          
10 These include: “Inter-agency organizations such as the National Coordinating Committees for the Implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
National Coordinating Committees for UNICEF and UNFPA, and National Commission for UNESCO, and social and non-
Governmental organizations such as the women’s union, youth league, the Democratic Lawyers’ Association, the bar association, 
teachers’ union, the Red Cross Society, the Federation for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities, Human Rights Institute, 
Education Fund, the Association for Family Planning and Maternal and Infant Health, Measure Committee for Demanding 
Compensation to “Comfort Women” for the Japanese Army and the Victims of Forcible Drafting are working for the protection and 
promotion of human rights in accordance with their respective missions and action programmes.” 
Marie Gertz Schlundt, Roskilde University, GS-K1 Project 
22 
 
gender equality” (Universal Periodic Review Working Group 2010) and the DPRK 
clearly spelled out numerous law reforms done to meet international standards of social, 
economic and cultural rights such as the Right to work, rest and leisure, social benefits, 
education, health, cultural life and rights of the persons with disabilities (Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) The national report of 
the DPRK for the Universal Periodic Review constitutes mainly of pages expressing 
results made in the area of social and economic rights and their institutionalization in 
national law and the constitution11. Focus is made on, amongst others, the health care 
system; “Complete and universal free medical care has been provided since February 1960, 
which was later legalized by the Constitution and the Public Health Law. Everyone in the 
DPRK receives medical service of all categories equally, practically and free of charge.” 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
Accession to the International Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) in 2001 has resulted in little change to the DPRK legal framework, 
“there are limited provisions under the Constitution that address the specific needs of 
women, as provided under CEDAW, and no provision to address violence against 
women.“ (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) However, the DPRK government 
argues it promulgated the Decree on Sex Equality on July 30, 1946 and, “further 
concretized the political status of women and their economic, social and cultural rights 
through the adoption of the Nationality Law, the Law on Election, the Law on Local 
Power Organs, the Civil Law, the Civil Procedures Law, the Family Law, the Law on 
Education, the Labour Law, the Law on Public Health, etc.” (The Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) Though, the Constitution and 
these adopted laws do guarantee, some degree of, gender equality, it needs to be 
recognized that there are, “various discrepancies disadvantaging women in the 
country12” (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010)  
                                                          
11 See Annex 3 in the Appendix 
12“Despite guarantees of gender equality in the Constitution, there are various discrepancies disadvantaging women in the country. 
First, their participation in earning a livelihood has been constrained by various peculiar measures imposed by the authorities as part 
of the clampdown on the market system. These include the prohibition of women under 
a certain age (49) from trading; the stricture that women are not allowed to wear trousers or ride bicycles; the injunction against 
colourful hair. The stricture against wearing trousers has now been lifted to some extent. In the army, women are supposed to 
bandage their breasts under their military uniforms to flatten them to avoid the image of sensuality. Such is the social engineering 
impeding the realization of women’s rights.” (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010) “Second, there are still stereotyped 
expectations which undermine women’s rights. For example, it is reported that women have to undergo virginity tests if they are to 
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As with the rights of women, the provisions under the Constitution that address the 
specific needs of children continue to be limited and no provision exist to address 
violence against children. (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) However, it can be 
argued that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1990 by the DPRK, 
the same year it came into force, has resulted in some law reforms and new policies 
concerning the development of children. (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) The 
DPRK refers to children as “the kings” of the country and argues that, “the State 
secured legal guarantees for bringing up children to be reliable leaders of the future and 
guaranteeing their rights to the fullest possible extent through the adoption of the 
Constitution and various laws.”13 (The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – 
Universal Periodic Review 2009) Specifically, the state has guaranteed the rights of 
children,  
through the adoption of the Constitution, the Law on Education, the Law 
on Public Health, the Law on Upbringing and Nursing of Children, the 
Social Security Law, the Law on the Protection of Persons with 
Disabilities, the Family Law, etc. With a view to further protecting the 
rights of the children the Government formulated in 1992 the National 
Action Plan for the Well-being of Children (1992-2000) and reviewed its 
implementation stage by stage. A new action plan for 2001-2010 
containing follow-up measures and new goals is being implemented 
through various programmes. (The Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
 
These positive steps taken towards ensuring the rights of children were further 
supported during the Universal Periodic Review, when Japan and other states noted 
certain positive steps undertaken by DPRK, “such as engaging in dialogue with the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child and cooperating with UNICEF to improve health 
situation and quality education for children.” (Universal Periodic Review Working 
Group 2010) With reference to the education of children, all children, “receive 
                                                                                                                                                                          
climb up the bureaucratic ladder.24 They are blamed for infertility.25 The wife of a political dissident is also pressured to divorce 
him.” (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010) 
13the Law on Education, the Law on Public Health, the Law on Upbringing and Nursing of Children, the Social Security Law, the 
Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities, the Family Law, etc 
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compulsory education free of charge starting from the age of six or seven under the 
universal 11-year free compulsory education system, giving full scope to their wishes 
and talents.” And the government has taken several steps to improve the quality of this 
education14  (The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 
2009) This has resulted in, as noted by the UN General-Secretary, that “a high 
percentage of children, both boys and girls between the age of 5 and 16, are attending 
school and are able to read (United Nations General Secretary 2010) and indicates 
strong institutionalization of the rights of children in the constitution and domestic law 
with clear results on the ground. Furthermore, educational systems (at university as well 
as primary and secondary level) provide studies on laws with human rights implications 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
Although state control over the judiciary remains strong and the freedom of movement 
as well as freedom of expression and opinion remains very limited, it can be concluded 
that the government of the DPRK has to a certain extent institutionalized norms through 
reform of and amendments to domestic law and the constitution. Particularly, reform of 
existing laws and emergence of new legal frameworks in the area of social rights and 
the rights of children pertaining to the health care and educational system have been 
strong.  
7.2 Improvement of the human rights condition on the ground in the DPRK 
As stated by Risse et al, “words need to be matched by deeds” and reaching the 
‘prescriptive stage’ and moving forward, towards the ultimate phase of the model, 
implies that the state makes a sustained effort to improve the human rights condition. 
On the basis of relevancy, the progress or lack thereof reported towards matching words 
with deeds will be limited to the actual law reforms mentioned in sub-chapter 7.1.  
 
                                                          
14 “The Government has undertaken various efforts to improve the quality of the 11-year free compulsory education system despite 
the economic hardship that persisted since the mid-1990s. The National Action Plan for Education for All was developed in 2001 in 
response to the Dakar Action Plan for Education for All of the UNESCO after an extensive discussion with the Ministry of 
Education, ministries concerned and research institutions, the implementation of which is being actively pursued. Various measures 
were adopted to encourage social support to educational work, while systematically increasing expenditure for education. 
Expenditure for education increased from 7.4 per cent in 2002 to 8 per cent in 2006. Currently 1,644,000 students are learning at 
4,904 primary schools and 2,415,000 students at 4,801 schools.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic 
Review 2009) 
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With reference to the signs of relaxation in the law on the freedom of movement 
introducing a lighter sanction for those leaving the country without permission, there 
continues to be recorded, “allegations of stricter control over the movement of people, 
especially those leaving the country.” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) 
Moreover, in 2009, “sanctions on the border(s) have become more stringent, influenced 
by various momentous events linked with national security.” (United Nations Special 
Rapporteur 2010) Additionally, severe punishment has been recorded in cases of forced 
return to the DPRK. (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) With reference to the use 
of force, though the Criminal Procedures Law strictly prohibits forcing a suspect to, 
“admit offence or leading statement by such coercive methods as torture or beating,” 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) numerous 
reports of instances of torture continue to be released. (United Nations Special 
Rapporteur 2010) 
 
When exploring the conditions under which human rights are internalized in the DPRK, it 
becomes essential to recognize the successive natural disasters in the mid-1990s, which 
brought some of, “the gravest difficulties to the economic development of the country.” 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) Thereby, 
limiting the extent to which the DPRK has been able to internalize the prescribed 
human rights. The natural disasters resulted in a limited food supply and a worsened 
health condition for the people as well as a devastated infrastructure of the national 
economy. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
Though, the DPRK adopted various measures to remove the after effects of natural 
disasters and reactivate the economy and notes a resultant increase of the GDP and State 
budget as well as an improvement of the people’s life in general. (Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) And, although UN findings show 
a marginal improvement in the food security situation between 2008 and 2009 (United 
Nations Secretary General 2010) Human Rights Watch argues that, “although the 
country recovered from the 1990s famine that killed millions, North Korea’s lack of 
high-quality seeds, fuel, fertilizer, advanced agricultural technologies, and even decent 
storage facilities have repeatedly resulted in domestic production being far too 
inadequate to feed its entire population.” (Human Rights Watch 2010) Interestingly, 
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these disasters have exerted a great deal of pressure on the national economy, food 
security and health institutions and can therefore be seen as causes of the DPRK making 
tactical concessions (acceding to and ratifying conventions) for the purpose of regaining 
aid. 
The DPRK states that women take part in political, social and cultural life on the same 
grounds as men and further argues that, “women make up 15.6 per cent of the deputies to 
the Supreme National Assembly. They account for 49 per cent of the workforce. There are 
thousands of associate doctors and doctors, and 463,000 engineers, technicians and 
specialists.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 
2009) Although, women are represented proportionally to men in the labor force, few 
women have reached high levels of the Party or the Government (Cammarota et al 
2007) and, “far fewer women than men complete a university education (only 1 out of 
12 women – above the age of 16 compared with 1 out of 7 men).” (United Nations 
General-Secretary 2010) The DPRK argues that, under its policy on public health, 
which focuses specifically on the promotion and protections of women’s health and 
reproductive health, “all women are under the responsible care of household doctors, 
obstetricians and gynecologists, which help improve their health steadily”15. Nonetheless, 
there is still acute humanitarian concern for at least 3.5 million children and women in 
the DPRK. This number is only expected to rise in 2010, “given ongoing food shortages 
resulting from the effects of previous and current floods and past drought” (United 
Nations General Secretary 2010) exerting even greater pressure on DPRK public health 
institutions.   
Although the rights of children are strongly institutionalized in national law, according 
to a 2008 report of the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, a Seoul-
based NGO, discrimination, still occurs for children with regards to access to education, 
humanitarian aid and health protection as it largely depends on which political class 
their families belong to. (Human Rights Watch 2010) Though, the Constitution does 
prohibit work by children under the age of sixteen, it contains no prohibition on forced 
labor by children, “allowing school children to be assigned to factories or farms for 
                                                          
15 More than 98 per cent of pregnant women receive the assistance of professionals in child delivery. The maternal mortality rate 
was 96.3 per 100,000 live births in 2006.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
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short periods to help meet production goals.” (Cammarota et al 2007) And although, the 
DPRK claims universal access to basic education, children often face stark realities at 
school, “there has been a general decline of the health and education infrastructure. 
Hospitals are short of medicines, schools are short of textbooks and both are short of 
electricity.” (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010)  
 
Though the institutionalization of human rights conventions in the national law and 
constitution of the DPRK could be seen to a certain extent, violations continue 
pertaining mainly to discrimination based on class and gender and restrictions of civil 
and political rights. Reports of torture continue to be released and restrictions on the 
freedom of movement and expression seen in the country directly oppose international 
human rights norms on this issue.  
7.3 Engagement through dialogue with critics of the human rights regime 
An important criterion of having reached the ‘prescriptive stage’ of the ‘spiral model’ is 
engaging through dialogue with critics of the human rights regime, where the state in 
question tries to legitimize its actions by referring to the norm, apologizes or promises 
and delivers compensation. It can be said that the fact that the DPRK chose to 
participate in the Universal Periodic Review is already a sign of a stronger dialogue 
with its critics. The choice can be said to indicate that the DPRK has become involved 
and entangled in, the “argumentative process which then becomes self-sustained 
constitutes.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 276) Though, “it might seem hopelessly naïve to 
attempt to “talk governments out” of human rights violations and talk is certainly not 
sufficient,” (Risse et al 1999, p. 276) research by Risse et al (1999) show that arguments 
are among the most powerful socializing tool of human rights actors.  
The DPRK states that it, “pays due regard to the international cooperation in the field of 
human rights and attaches importance to genuinely constructive dialogues and 
cooperation with international human rights bodies.” (Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) Furthermore, the DPRK states it will take the 
observations and recommendations, made in the review of its periodic reports on the 
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conventions, into account.16 This does seem to indicate an, though only official, 
acceptance of dialogue and cooperation with its critics.  
During the Universal Periodic Review, the DPRK made several references to UN 
standards and human rights norms and how the DPRK has adopted measures to meet 
these, for example regarding health standards,  
In its efforts to attain the relevant targets of the Millennium Development 
Goals of the United Nations and the Strategy for Health for All of the 
WHO the Government has adopted measures to supply safe drinking water 
to all people, prevent communicable diseases through the increased 
immunization coverage and improve the primary health care service. 
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 
2009) 
Furthermore, the DPRK sets goals with reference to international human rights norms, 
“the Government takes it as the supreme principle of its activities to steadily raise the 
material and cultural standards of people and is taking various legislative and policy 
measures to meet the demands of people for affluent life with decent food, clothing and 
housing.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
Though, this shows a certain degree of constructive dialogue with its critics, certain 
statements also show a somewhat different interpretation of human rights than intended 
by the conventions. 
It is of the view that as human rights are guaranteed by sovereign States, 
any attempt to interfere in others’ internal affairs, overthrow the 
governments and change the systems on the pretext of human rights issues 
constitutes violations of human rights. In this sense, the DPRK holds that 
human rights immediately mean national sovereignty. (Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
                                                          
16 “The DPRK has taken into serious consideration the observations and recommendations made by the treaty bodies, and accepted 
and implemented them in the light of its reality.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
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This link between human rights and national sovereignty and view that interfering in 
others internal affairs constitutes violations of human rights can be argued to be 
somewhat distant from UN interpretations of human rights. The UN does state that, 
“state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself.” (Responsibility to Protect 2001) 
However, making the argument that any attempt to interfere in others’ internal affairs, 
overthrow the governments and change the systems on the pretext of human rights 
issues constitutes violations of human rights does seem to be strongly opposed by the 
UN argument that, “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal 
war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect. (Responsibility to Protect 2001) Furthermore, as argued by 
Risse et al (1999),   
The international community also appears to agree today that the principle 
of national sovereignty can no longer be invoked to fight off accusations 
of severe human rights violations. As a result norm denial might no longer 
be a viable option for norm-violating regimes in their argumentative 
battles with the transnational networks. (Risse et al 1999, p. 266) 
This again shows the weakness in the argument made by the DPRK in placing such 
importance on national sovereignty to fight off accusations of severe human rights 
violations. 
The DPRK continues to disregard and in fact, oppose UN resolutions and argues they 
are, “root sources of mistrust and confrontation, and the impediments to international 
cooperation” due to their “politized and selective” nature, claiming “selective attack and 
cooperation are incompatible” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal 
Periodic Review 2009) It is a UN resolution that mandates the work of the Special 
Rapporteur which therefore explains the reluctance of the DPRK to allow entry to the 
Special Rapporteur. This opposition towards UN resolutions indicates little signs of 
constructive dialogue. Furthermore, as characteristic of early stages of the “spiral 
model,” in an attempt to fight off the challenges to its legitimacy, the DPRK engages in, 
“anti-colonial and anti-imperialist as well as national discourse” (Risse et al, p. 251) 
The DPRK does just that by responding to accusations on their official national website 
Marie Gertz Schlundt, Roskilde University, GS-K1 Project 
30 
 
by stating that, “unlike in many countries of the capitalist world, the DPRK is a state 
free of homelessness, unemployment, prostitution and starvation.” (The Government of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2009) 
Nevertheless, the participation of the DPRK in the Universal Periodic Review process 
can be said to indicate communicative behavior between the DPRK and its international 
critics that resembles “notions of dialogue, argumentation and justification.” (Risse et al 
1999, p. 30) However, the rejection to cooperate with the UN special rapporteur and 
consequent denial of entrance into the country, contending that the “mandate represents 
an extreme manifestation of politicization, selectivity and double standards in the area 
of human rights.” (United Nations General Secretary 2010) As well as the lacking 
engagement with the treaty bodies seen by yearlong outstanding periodic reports17 and a 
rejection of close to half of the recommendations made by Member States during the 
review process, “arguing that they were based on a misunderstanding of the realities in 
the country or on misinformation” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) all indicate 
little resemblance of such notions. 
 
Though, the DPRK continues to deny violations, uses national sovereignty to fight of 
human rights violations and engages in limited cooperation, the DPRK does show some 
signs of, at least, having the ambition of engaging in a constructive dialogue. This, by 
focusing on making references to international human rights norms and how it will 
adopt measures to meet these norms in the future as well as by indicating that it will 
take observations and recommendation of the UN reviews into account 
8. Conclusion  
 
To summarize the findings of the analysis, it can be said that, with reference to the first 
benchmark, the government of the DPRK has to a certain extent institutionalized norms 
                                                          
17 With regard to engagement with the treaty bodies, as of July 2010 the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
had yet to submit to the Human Rights Committee its third periodic report on the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. The report has been due since 1 January 2004. Likewise, the second State party report to the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women and the third periodic report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been due since 27 March 2006 and 30 
June 2008, respectively.” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) 
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through reform of and amendments to domestic law and the constitution. Particularly, 
reform of existing laws and emergence of new legal frameworks in the area of social 
rights and the rights of children pertaining to the health care and educational system 
have been strong. The institutionalization of civil and political rights, as prescribed in 
the CCPR, however remains weak due to disregard for the freedom of movement as 
well as freedom of expression and continued state control. 
Secondly, with regards to the second benchmark, though the institutionalization of 
human rights conventions in the national law and constitution of the DPRK could be 
seen to a certain extent, violations, on the ground, continue pertaining mainly to 
discrimination based on class and gender and restrictions of civil and political rights. 
Specifically, reports of torture continue to be released and restrictions on the freedom of 
movement and expression seen in the country directly oppose international human 
rights norms on this issue. However, it can be concluded that, though discrimination 
continues, improvement of social rights and the rights of children as well as women can 
be seen to a certain extent both in the legal framework as well as in results on the 
ground.  
 
Thirdly, though, the DPRK continues to deny violations, uses national sovereignty to 
fight of human rights violations and engages in limited cooperation, the DPRK does 
show some signs of engaging in a constructive dialogue, by making references to 
international human rights norms and how it will adopt measures to meet these norms in 
the future as well as by indicating that it will take observations and recommendation of 
the UN reviews into account. Whether this will, in fact, be upheld remains to be seen. 
Particularly, delegates at the Universal Periodic Review raised concerns with regards to, 
“the situation in political prisons and detention centres; allegations of extrajudicial 
execution; forced labour; criminal sanctions imposed on people trying to leave the 
country; the absence of a national human rights institution; difficulties in realizing the 
right to food, the lack of engagement with the special procedures; and the rejection of 
the offer of technical assistance made by OHCHR.” (United Nations Secretary-General 
2010) At the same time, delegates noted positive initiatives of the DPRK with a specific 
focus on, “the policy of providing 11 years of compulsory, free primary education, the 
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plan aimed at the complete eradication of illiteracy, comprehensive and universal free 
medical care, specific public strategies in the field of health, and the inclusion of human 
rights in the Constitution in April 2009.” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) And 
the DPRK mentioned 30 sector specific laws of the DPRK with human rights 
implications.18 It can therefore be concluded that the internalization of human rights in 
the DPRK through accession to and ratification of specific international conventions, 
has led to some, though limited, domestic legal reforms and human rights improvements 
for the North Korean people. The DPRK claims it will take the useful recommendations 
and observations seriously. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal 
Periodic Review 2009) However, it remains to be seen to what extent the authorities 
will accept the numerous recommendations emerging from the Universal Periodic 
Review and how they will substantiate follow-up measures as a consequence of the 
review. It also remains to be seen whether Six-Party Talks, to help denuclearize the 
country and thereby provide space for an improved environment on human rights in the 
country, will be resumed. (United Nations Special Rapporteur 2010)  
 
The findings do show a certain prioritization of social rights as compared to political 
and civil rights by the DPRK. Focusing on social equality can be said to be 
representative of communist ideals. The DPRK, “will continue to hold fast to its own 
socialist human rights theory and policy, the validity of which has been fully 
manifested.” (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 
2009) Furthermore, as compared to political and civil rights, social rights seem to a 
larger extent transcend any cultural or historical context of states because these rights 
resonate strongly with basic ideas of human dignity common to most cultures and has 
therefore been able to, a larger extent, gain ground internationally.  (Sikkink & 
Finnemore 1998)  
                                                          
18 Nationality Law, Law on Election of Deputies to the People’s Assemblies at All Levels, Law on the Constitution of Local Power 
Organs, Socialist Labour Law , Law on Food Administration, Education Law,  Law on Public Health, Law on Upbringing 
and Nursing of Children, Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities, Law on the Protection of Elderly Persons, 
Social Security Law, Law on Medial Care, Law on Prevention of Communicable Diseases, Law on Food Hygiene , Law on 
Public Sanitation, Law on Physical Culture and Sport, Law on Environmental Protection, Civil Law, Civil Procedures Law, 
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedures Law, Law on Complaints and Petitions, Family Law, Law on Inheritance, Law on 
Compensation for Damages, Law on Constitution of Court, Lawyers’ Law, Law on Notary Public, Law on Citizens’ 
Registration, Law on City Administration, Law on Dwellings, Copyright Law, Law on Invention, Law on Industrial 
Design, Trademark Law. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
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The argument by Risse et al, that regardless of why states ratify and accede to 
international conventions, the results are that they, “become entangled in arguments and 
the logic of argumentative rationality slowly but surely takes over.” (Risse et al 1999, p. 
16) can be said to correspond to a certain degree to the DPRK with regards to its, 
though limited, engagement with critics, institutionalization of norms in law and 
constitution as well as improvement on the ground. 
Though the engagement of the DPRK with the universal periodic review mechanisms of 
the Human Rights Council has been “encouraging and, to a large extent, constructive.” 
(United Nations Secretary-General 2010) The country is lacking a comprehensive 
approach towards human rights issues, this because of a number of issues. They have 
failed to ratify optional protocols to the acceded and ratified conventions.19 The 
governments does not recognize the resolutions of the Human Rights Council and the 
General Assembly and has refused vital technical support by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) 
Furthermore, the DPRK is not a party to various other essential human rights 
conventions; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and the Optional Protocol thereto, the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families or the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. (United 
Nations Secretary-General 2010)  
 
The Korean peninsula has in 2010 again become the focus of the world with recent 
tension between the North and the South, played out firstly with the sinking of the 
South Korean submarine, the Cheonan, by a North Korean torpedo, killing 46 sailors in 
April 2010. (BBC 2010) And later, the airstrike carried out by the DPRK in response to 
military training exercise carried out by South Korea on the island of Yeonpyeong in 
November 2010. (Kim & Lee 2010) The tension created by these recent development in 
                                                          
19 “In addition, treaty bodies have urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to ratify the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women11 and the Optional Protocols to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography and on the involvement of children in armed 
conflict.12” (United Nations Secretary-General 2010) 
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the Korean peninsula involving great powers and great military capabilities can be 
argued to have lead international attention away from a discussion of the domestic 
human rights situation. The involvement of great military capabilities creates a situation 
where the response of the UN and the western great powers, regarding the domestic 
human rights of the North Korean people, can be said to be of constraint. This, because 
a stronger approach may interfere with the military and nuclear armistice and non-
proliferation deals because these are, according to realist thought, a greater priority of 
outside states. 
On the other hand, recent tensions may also create further focus on the two countries 
and therefore also a further focus on their situation regarding human rights. One 
example of this is the November 29, 2010 release of a secretly filmed video showing 
rare images from within the DPRK of poverty and signs of disobedience. It came as 
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak described the November 2010 attack by the 
DPRK on the South Korean island as an “inhumane crime.” (Hogg 2010) Furthermore, 
the conflict can also be said to show a new approach of the DPRK government. Though, 
many political and strategic motives can be said to have resulted in the DPRK reference 
to the civilian deaths of its attack on the South Korean island as, ‘very regrettable,’ 
(Reuters 2010) it can also be said to represent notions of a more comprehensive 
international human rights based approach, perhaps as a result of the, though limited, 
reformed domestic legal framework.  
The extent of the acceptance of the DPRK of international human rights norms and the 
conditions under which it believes human rights norms can be ensured is important in 
answering to what extent human rights norms are, in fact, institutionalized in the DPRK. 
In considering what conditions are essential for the effective ensuring of a full range of 
human rights, the DPRK argues a state should,  
(i) Defend the country against foreign interference and achieve durable peace and 
stability;  
(ii) Build a social system free from the root source of exploitation and oppression;  
(iii) Ensure that unity and cooperation between persons prevail society, and not 
confrontation and mistrust and;  
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(iv) Attain high level of economic development based on cutting-edge science and 
technology, and promote healthy culture. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
– Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
It can be argued that the government of the DPRK, in the above list of conditions, spells 
out a need for isolation, lacking participation in an international market, 
authoritarianism and nuclear proliferation in ensuring the protection and promotion of 
human rights. Conditions that, according to many states and notions of new modern 
statehood, in fact, block the protection and promotion of human rights in any state.   
It can be argued that the Iraqi and Afghan wars have given norm-violating states an 
excuse to use strong arguments against interference in national affairs and arguments for 
limiting its further engagement with the international community. The DPRK clearly 
shows this by stating that, 
Aggression by the United States in recent years upon other countries and 
their mass killing of civilians left a serious lesson that failure to defend the 
national sovereignty will result in inability to defend the rights of people 
to life. The DPRK will further intensify its self-defensive measures in 
order to safeguard sovereignty and dignity, and human rights of its 
citizens. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic 
Review 2009) 
Furthermore, the fact that the USA and other states were able to escape the 
entanglement of the legal framework relating to the civil and political rights of the 
Geneva Convention when faced with national security issues can be said to have further 
strengthened the excuses of and arguments made by norm-violating states when limiting 
their engagement with the international community. 
 “For decades now IR research has been divorced from political theory on the grounds 
(implicitly, if not explicitly, articulated) that what "is" in the world and what "ought to 
be" are very different and must be kept separate, both intellectually and in policy. 
However, contemporary empirical research on norms is aimed precisely at showing how 
the "ought" becomes the "is." Empirical research documents again and again how 
people's ideas about what is good and what "should be" in the world become translated 
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into political reality.” (Sikkink and Finnemore 1998) This corresponds to the research 
conducted in the project by focusing on how what “should be” (International human 
rights norms) in the world becomes translated into political reality (domestic laws and 
domestic realities). This sort of research is furthermore, interesting for understanding 
how other principled commitments and notions of what “should be” have fueled issues 
such as xenophobic nationalism (Sikkink & Finnemore 1998) An Issue which is very 
likely to become an increasing challenge for world politics, making it likely that this 
sort of research will become increasingly important.   
As argued by Koenig and as seen using the case of the DPRK, “changing semantics in 
global human rights discourse do seem to have at least some impact on domestic 
political change.” (Koenig 2008) It can be concluded that though international law 
aspires to protect universal standards of human rights, using international law to curb 
human rights abuses remains challenging. The various international legal regimes and 
institutions present a complex network of possibilities. These difficulties are strongest 
of all in the case of an isolated minimally democratic state such as the DPRK, which is 
largely resistant to the dictates of international law and the force of international 
opinion. However, the international human rights regime still has opportunities for 
action; opportunities which become larger as a result of states acceding to and ratifying 
international human rights conventions as they subsequently, according to the “spiral 
model”, become entangled in an international and domestic legal process which they 
subsequently find harder and harder to escape. (Risse et al 1999, p. 248) Furthermore, 
as argued by Benhabib, it needs to be recognized that, “law involves anticipation of 
justice to come that it can never quite fulfill but that it always points toward.” 
(Benhabib 2009)  
When taking this and other mentioned conditions of the international human rights 
regime into account and using the DPRK as the main case and the “spiral model” as the 
theoretical framework, it can be concluded that international human rights norms in the 
form of international human rights conventions influence the actions of minimally 
democratic and isolated states to a certain extent, though largely as a socializing tool 
which gradually helps work towards the goal of human rights improvements. 
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10. Appendix 
 
Annex 1. List of the typical national institutions that participated in the 
preparation of the national report for the Universal Periodic Review  
(1) Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly  
(2) Secretariat of the Cabinet  
(3) Central Court  
(4) Central Public Prosecutors Office  
(5) State Planning Commission  
(6) Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(7) Ministry of People’s Security  
(8) Ministry of Finance  
(9) Ministry of Education  
(10) Ministry of Public Health  
(11) Ministry of Agriculture  
(12) Ministry of Food Administration  
(13) Ministry of Labour  
(14) Ministry of Culture  
(15) Ministry of Land and Environment Protection  
(16) Ministry of Construction  
(17) Ministry of City Administration  
(18) State Bureau of Quality Supervision  
(19) Invention Office  
(20) Central Statistics Bureau.  
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
Annex 2. List of Social organizations, academic institutions and non-Governmental 
organizations that participated in the consultation for the preparation of the 
national report for the Universal Periodic Review  
(1) Korean Human Rights Institute  
(2) Central Committee of the Korean Bar Association  
(3) Korean Democratic Lawyers’ Association  
(4) Central Committee of the Korean Trade Union  
(5) Central Committee of the Korean Agricultural Workers’ Union  
(6) Central Committee of the Korean Democratic Women’s Union  
(7) Central Committee of Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League  
(8) Central Committee of the DPRK Red Cross Society  
(9) Korean Religionists’ Conference  
(10) Central Committee of Korean Chondoists’ Society  
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(11) Central Committee of Korean Buddhists’ Federation  
(12) Central Committee of Korean Christians’ Federation  
(13) Central Committee of Korean Roman Catholic Federation  
(14) Central Committee of Korean Journalists’ Union  
(15) Korean Medical Association  
(16) Central Committee of Korean Federation for the Protection of Persons with Disabilities  
(17) Korean Association for Family Planning and Maternal and Infant Health  
(18) Population Institute  
(19) Korea Education Fund  
(20) Law College of the Kim Il Sung University  
(21) Law Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences  
(22) University of National Economy.  
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – Universal Periodic Review 2009)  
Annex 3. List of social and economic rights listed in the DPRK report of the 
Universal Periodic Review 
“It also explicitly stipulates that these rights and freedoms are provided to everyone 
equally and practically, and shall be amplified with the consolidation and development 
of the socialist system.”  
“The Constitution and many other laws contain provisions concerning the development 
of individual freedom and individual qualities. This is a freedom of healthy 
individuality, as it does not mean the freedom of “self-indulgence” which prejudices 
others’ freedom or disregards the law.”  
“In the DPRK, equality is fully ensured based on unity and cooperation between 
persons. No citizen is discriminated on the basis of his/her race, sex, language, religion, 
education, occupation and position and property, and all citizens exercise equal rights in 
all fields of the State and public activities.”  
“Citizens have the right to work under the Constitution and the labour-related laws and 
regulations. All citizens choose their occupations according to their wishes and talents 
and are provided with secure jobs and working conditions by the State. They work 
according to their abilities and receive remuneration according to the quantity and 
quality of the work done 
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 “All the working people are provided with equal remuneration for equal work without 
distinction as to sex, age and nationality. Women receive equal pay with men for equal 
work and, in particular, women with three or more children are paid eight hours’ salary 
for six hours’ work.”  
“The State adopted legislative measures to prevent any practices that violate political 
and economic rights and freedoms of citizens in their working life. The relevant laws 
provide that women should not be employed in such areas as are prohibited by law, that 
labour protection and safety facilities be sufficiently provided, that the principle of 
remunerating according to the quantity and quality of the work done be strictly 
observed, and that citizens’ complaints and petitions concerning, for instance, not 
assigning the right job to a right person in time and their rights to work be addressed 
fairly and promptly. Accordingly, legal punishments are meted out to managerial 
officers responsible for any practices contrary to these principles.”  
“The right of the working people to rest and leisure is provided by the Constitution and 
other labour-related laws and regulations. This right is ensured by the establishment of 
the working hours, the provision of holidays, paid leave, accommodation at health 
resorts and holiday homes at State expense and by a growing network of cultural 
facilities. The working day is eight hours and overtime work is strictly prohibited. In 
case working on a holiday was unavoidable in circumstances of serial non-stop 
production process and disaster relief operation, workers are given a day off in the 
following week. They have a fortnight’s regular holiday every year with full payment of 
salary and, depending on their trades, they are entitled to an additional holiday of seven 
to twenty-one days. In addition to regular and additional holidays, working women 
enjoy maternity leaves, sixty days before and ninety days after the childbirth.”  
“All citizens are legally entitled to the benefits of the State social security and social 
insurance.”   
“In case workers and office employees stay away from work temporarily on account of 
illness, injury, tending of a sick family member, recuperation or other reasons, they 
receive subsidies. Women receive, during their maternity leave, maternity subsidies 
equal to 100 per cent of their monthly salaries. There are also social security pension 
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granted to those who are under social security scheme and those who lost ability to 
work, nursing subsidy to those who tend disabled soldiers and seriously injured person, 
funeral subsidy to those under social security scheme and their families when they pass 
away, grant-in-aid to the dependents of servicemen and supplementary living allowance 
to the weak.” 
“The expenses for the State social security and social insurance are disbursed from the 
State budget, of which the social insurance premium paid by the working people 
accounts for one percent.”  
(Democratic People’s Republic of Korea –Universal Periodic Review 2009) 
 
